



Competition, Regulation and Strategy in Industries with Consumer 









The IT industry (both software and hardware) is characterised by `vast consumer side 
scale and scope economies' which are incomparably larger than in other industries with 
supply side network economies like pipelines or electricity distribution. In IT the supply 
side economies are also incomparably larger because the marginal cost of an additional 
unit of the software or hardware especially the former is very small. But its uniqueness 
arises on the demand side. The interaction of these two economies, in a situation of 
heightened technological dynamism, imposes a greater degree of contingency, and hence 
path dependency in the developments in the industry as a whole. In this respect these 
industries are therefore distinguished from nearly all other prior industries. It makes 
possible giants line Microsoft and CISCO. Even as they extract significant part of the 
scale economies in the form of large profits, such firms are competitive in the more 
relevant dynamic sense. The endogeniety of  critical points in the development of the 
industry implies considerable scope for strategy on the part of such large firms. It also 
means that inter-firm linkages dynamically develop and thrive even in societies like the 
US that have been abhorrent of extra-market links, and have had the conceptual space to 
recognise only two kinds of economic coordination - within firms (managerial 
hierarchies) and through markets. Path dependency implies that physical clusters in IT 
have a far stronger economic logic, and the difficulties in the emergence of new clusters 
are far more severe. 
 
Traditional anti-trust like regulation or price regulation is entirely outmoded for the 
development of these industries. To challengers (countries and clusters) few independent 
options exist. Strategies with the most potential would involve promoting inter-firm 
linkages, promoting industries with the least need to be in contact with other firms, in 
fresh clusters. The effort has to be to lower the time and cost of networking with the 
dominant cluster. The costs of disassociation are too large even for large countries 
attempting to have a role in the evolution of IT industries, so that closed-door approaches 
are almost entirely unworkable. 
 
I 
Technological Change, Scale Economies and Regulation 
 
Regulation and competition laws seek to ensure that industries and firms do not make 
unearned profits (or rents). Conceptually, in a static model of the economy it is easy to 
differentiate between competitive and non-competitive behaviour and structures. Yet, in 
practice if the primary objective of a regulation is as stated viz., the minimisation of 
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unearned profits or rents, then it is very difficult to rule that a particular situation or 
behaviour is anti-competitive. This is because over time, given technological dynamism, 
and changes in income, the parameters that are constant in the simple static model 
themselves change. Similarly, over time, as new products and substitutes emerge, the 
assumptions and the very definition of the product or service changes. Therefore, 
workable competition policy can hardly be defined for the industrial economy as a whole, 
or be codified at a point in time and presumed to remain valid for many years to come. 
They, if at all, would need to be industry specific and dynamic. This is easier said than 
done, since past patterns, and experience, can tell us so little about the future that is 
driven by technological change
3. 
 
Yet, in certain industries such as airlines, cement, natural monopolies, and others, which 
tend to large size, the need for some kind of regulation can be argued since market 
dominance, can (though not necessarily) lead to abuse of power. A closer look at the 
industries that could gain through a policy or regulation would reveal that many of them 
besides having a monopolistic character are also not subject to significant technological 
dynamism.  The telecom industry began to show renewed technological dynamism after 
its maturity in the twenties, with the invention of the transistor and especially the IC in 
the sixties.  Yet the adherence to traditional regulation or oversight of tariffs and rates had 
most certainly slowed down absorption of cost reducing and feature enhancing 
innovations and developments in the industry. More than `regulation of a natural 
monopoly', competition policy in such technologically dynamic industries then has the 
task of removing or destroying structures inappropriate to discovery, and invention, and 
especially innovation. It was only after the break up of ATT that the dam holding back 
the use of new technology broke. Today, given technological dynamism in the telecom 
industry, and the flux with regard to products and services, it is difficult to see a role for 
competition policy that can be anticipated and codified in a law
4, to be dealt with by the 
law without recourse to the study and opinion of experts.  Even expert bodies could go 
completely wrong. 
 
Technology (i.e. rapid technical change) is one factor that vitiates any meaningful attempt 
to put in place a competition or regulation policy embodied in a piece of legislation that is 
clear enough. It may also negate the need for `formal competition policy' as such, because 
inherent in the technological dynamism is the aspect of self-regulation, cost reduction, 
feature enhancement etc., even when `super-normal profits' are made. Such super-normal 
profits have not been generally considered as undesirable since they could be considered 
                                                           
3 This is so well known that, and accepted; yet forgotten in discussions on regulation. Thus, even 
Thomas Watson (Jr.) projected that the world demand for computers would be in the scores at 
best, and everybody in the industry was stumped by the success of the PC. Even the motor car or 
dynamo's successes were not convincingly predicted. 
4 China today when it attempts to force the standardisation of equipment and protocols related to 
telecommunications, is doing the right thing, because the codification of equipment and parts that 
it can engender would have far greater competitive effect to result in consumer benefit than 
anything directly regulatory in the conventional sense in the sector.  
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There is another situation wherein traditional competition policy based on antitrust, 
reduction in concentration ratios, divestment, and reduction in vertical integration, have 
severe limitations. Examples would be network industries like telecom, road and rail 
transport, which are well recognised as industries appropriate for imaginative regulation. 
(In telecom though, the aspect of rapid technological change vitiates the role of traditional 
price or return based regulation.) Recently, regulation has taken the form of light RPI-X 
type, sliding scale
6, and even unbundling across activities to allow for a constructed 
competition whenever possible, and light regulation with better incentive compatibility 
elsewhere. More importantly, competition in electricity generation, separation of the 
wires business from the trade in power, have all served to give regulation a fresh aspect. 
These developments we may group together under the term "rules of behaviour and 
access, to create competition without destroying scale economies." Thus, access rules and 
interconnect rules in telecom, standard charges for network access in telecom, power and 
railways, grid rules in electricity are of this nature. 
 
II 
Consumer Side Scale and Scope Economies 
 
This much is well known. What is not recognised well enough is that in certain modern 
industries, the epitome of which would be the mass-market computer industry, there are 
significant consumption side economies of scale and scope.  These arise on the joint use 
of software and products that have a vertical and horizontal - suite - relationship to each 
other. They give industries such as branded software, computer hardware and parts a 
vastly different aspect. It is quite true that the neo-classical assumption that consumption 
takes place in isolation, of one's neighbours, or that the rest of society's consumption has 
little effect on the utility of the individual, is a useful abstraction. But abstraction 
nevertheless it is. We know that in the so-called life-style associated products, the punk 
drives utility from the fact that other punks wear leather, and similarly do other subgroups 
and subcultures of society with regard to their own iconic products. The economic (or 
marketing) dimension of fashion is the exploitation of this opportunity that is there in the 
utility of consumption of one person to be dependent upon the numbers of `relevant' 
others consuming the same product. In life-style associated products as in many other 
well known products and services, such dependence is based on `ephemeral' psychology 
and is small enough to be abstracted away by the economist. Despite its neglect by the 
economist, the marketing man realises the value of such dependent utility. Language, if 
one may think of it as a product, is, par excellence, a case of vast user side economies. 
The value of a person's familiarity with a language is a function of the number of relevant 
others that are familiar with it. Thus, multiple languages (that are also socially functional) 
typically do not exist in a mass society, and accents converge with the passage of time, 
 
5 While the existence of super-normal profits as a reward for innovation can hardly be questioned, 
the level of such profits could be; and especially so in sectors with vast systematic consumer side 
economies as the IT sector. We will clarify this point later. 
6 Sliding scale regulation is not really recent. It has been in existence in sectors like municipal 
lighting, water, and piped gas in the early part of this century. It was rediscovered during the 
deregulation era of the eighties.  
 
4
                                                          
despite very strong emotional and economic value in attachment to a different (own) 
language by minorities during early childhood. Huge consumer side costs of shifting 
would mean that languages change only vary slowly. The need for universality in 
measurements (of length, time, etc.) arising from the high cost of mistakes in conversion 
from one system to another, would mean that even in a situation of weak across subgroup 
interaction, competing standards would not survive
7. 
 
Consumer Economies in Computer IT Industry 
 
In computer usage, the value to an individual using a particular brand or type of world 
processor is considerably enhanced when others with whom he interacts uses the same 
product. Thus, even if he had large cost of shifting out from brand Z, when most others 
use brand Y, he would have to shift out, despite the possibility that brand Y is superior 
and brand X is less appropriate to his specific needs. Conversion programs are possible, 
but are `never' the same. Similarly, the value arising out of avoidance of risk and 
incompatibility in the use of the brand over product categories together when they have a 
vertical relationship between them –(as for instance between operating system and 
application software, or machine and operating system) is very large. Additionally, the 
consumer side economies also arise out of considerable lowering of the learning costs for 
new users and users moving along the main evolutionary path
8, which itself is a result of 
the consumer side economies mentioned earlier. This implies that in such industries there 
is `path dependence' and changes have to go over feasible transition paths, quite like in 
biological evolution. Feasibility herein, as also in the evolution of morphological features 
in nature, is such that a large leap has to have a feasible path consisting of a number of 
small jumps, since otherwise, the costs of relearning, and loss of connectedness with the 
rest of the world by those adopting the new development, when not gradual, are too large. 
What is true of software is also true of machines, components, cards, subsystem, etc
9. 
 
Interaction with the Supply Side 
 
The matter does not end in only recognising these joint economies in consumption. These 
consumption side economies in turn could drive producing firms, and collections of firms 
to strategically posture to take advantage of these expected consumption side economies. 
This they could do through very low prices for initial users (or high prices when there is 
no question of challenge at all) and near certainty of adoption, free compatibility with 
 
7 Thus only the `metric' and British systems survive today, and without the insistence of the 
Americans, the British system should have been given up long ago. 
8 Many levels of courses and learning programmes and virtual explosion of books and materials 
related to learning, are all possible because of the large market for skill up gradation, to enable 
people to be a part of the community of computers users. 
9 It also means that a basic form such as a stiff backbone or warm blood, once it emerges, is 
embedded in the morphology of all living beings that evolve from the mutant, to serve various 
functions, to result in classes that have an evolutionary meaning. Similarly, in the IT world, core 
developments like say a Von Neumann architecture, for all digital, or sort routines that are 
embedded in software, or methods of addressing memory, program components, are the building 
blocks that live on through the vintages of machines and programs as they as they evolve. The 
analogy continues at the level of the relationship between the product and the environment, with 
the species and the ecological environment. The environment in both cases is defined by other 
products or other species, and their functions.  
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existing products by the challenger, and so on. In software, as also in certain hardware, 
like microprocessors of mass use, the marginal costs are very low as to be negligible in 
relation to fixed (or initial development costs). Therefore, the market has few stable 
points, and they all tend towards one producer, one brand or a line of product. The second 
player would always be a niche player, and would have to wait his turn with a vastly 
better product and a feasible transition path as the market greatly expands, or to cater to a 
new market as the existing one segments or splits. 
 
Thus, the positive feedback from consumer side economies to the producer side 
economies in software, in mass markets, has created a giant like Microsoft. A 'market of 
sorts' in technology would mean that even if the internal capacity of the dominant player 
to generate fresh technology and innovate is, over time, reduced
10, it can always buy up 
inventions, and success factors, including such lines of products and ideas for new and 
emerging segments of the markets. The "take over" of successful small firms is inevitable 
owing to the vast asymmetry in the benefits to both consumers and producers between 
being on the path of convergence and compatibility of the new technology/idea, in 
relation to a divergent or different path. Indeed, so large is the difference in the value to 
the creator of the new technology that the object of challenger is to be taken over. In other 
words, the growth phase of a new product or technology arises out of a `solution' in full 
cooperation with the dominant firm, or in other words acceptance of the existing 





We have not yet brought in physical connectedness that the Internet demands and brings 
about. This aspect further deepens the potential consumer side economies that would 
drive the industry towards centralisation ultimately, even if when today the technology 
creation process is apparently more plural.  This is because the Internet industry or the 
industry for physical connectedness is still at an early stage, and many new ideas, 
technologies; ways of applying those technologies are still awaited. The creative acts 
required for these developments can hardly be imagined before they occur, nor can they 
be planned for. They would necessarily have to go through the process of serendipity, 
chance and the `activities of mavericks.' This means that even as centralisation is the final 
point, the fact of continuing fresh developments would keep alive, and create many small 
firms. The characterisation of this phase of the industry as Phase I of Stephen Magee
11 is 
illuminating. Nevertheless, the difference from Magee's conceptualisation is crucial. The 
phase of `basic' and innovative development continues even into Phase II when 
 
10 In evolutionary changes, the large corporations would have all the ideas; but for those 
remarkable and truly novel (revolutionary) ideas, there are managerial limits to motivating 
employees to invent and innovate within a company. Even stock options and developments in 
differentiation and integration (a la Lawrence & Lorsch) cannot really bridge the gap between the 
`maverick' inventor working on his own and the corporate inventor (Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, 
J.W., (1967), "Organisation and Environment," Boston Harvard Business School Press). 
11 Magee Stephen (1977), "Multinational Corporations, The Industry Technology Cycle and 
Development," Journal of World Trade Law, pp 297-321, which is a development of the product 
cycle approach of Vernon, Raymond (1964), “The Product Life Cycle in International Trade”,  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics.  
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centralisation via takeovers etc. is evident. Thus the industry has a `forever’ -immature 
character, with high rates of growth and obsolescence as long there is a continuous stream 
of innovations and final demand exists.  
 
III 
The Regulatory Challenge 
 
Traditional regulation and competition policies have little role in the evolution and 
development of such industries. Economists neglect the vast consumer side economies, 
and their interactions with the more understood scale and scope factors on the production 
side, which drive firms to large size and dominance. Similarly, traditional anti-trust laws 
still hold on to the idea of an absolute value of a product to the consumer and of consumer 
independence. These would mean an inability to recognise the functionality of a growing 
large firm giving great value to consumers. Traditional regulation or policy would also 
not be alert to the ways by which large dominant firms abuse their special position. The 
dominant firm in keeping itself in dominance could act to keep the industry at lower rates 
of innovations, lower levels of services and features. This need not take place in a manner 
that is obvious or recognisable. Such a dominant firm could lay to the side possible 
superior ideas and innovations, which would therefore die, especially since their value is 
contingent upon the particular path chosen, and dominance can greatly influence that 
choice. 
 
Yet, the evolutionary aspect, arising out of both learning costs on the part of users and 
consumers in general, and out of the finite time required for the fullest development of a 
technology or idea, select some innovations/ideas and reject others. And technical 
superiority is only one aspect in that process. Can any regulator convincingly decide that 
one (the sunk costs of learning for instance) or the other (abuse) consideration operated at 
a critical juncture in the development of the industry? Quite obviously no! But then what 
can the solution be, if at all there is a need for a solution? There is little that can be said 
with confidence. The problem is one of fundamental uncertainty; and `humps' in the 
evolution of such industries greatly reduce the value of prior expertise or experience as a 
guide. Furthermore, there is a basic difference between the IT sector and earlier industries 
that amounts to making IT industries fundamentally different from all others.  
 
The key `humps' or forks in the actual road that the industry takes is, to a far greater 
extent than in other industries before, determined endogenously with the dominant 
players having a large, even overwhelming role. The growth of the IT industry has some 
elements of the unfoldment of the story out of the characters created, than that being 
entirely the natural revelation of the possibilities arising out of a revolutionary technical 
understanding as was the case in the electrical or chemical industries. 
 
Ex-post therefore, to the keen observer of the industry, it would then seem as if the 
industry could have more quickly moved to its present status in terms of product range, 
and size without some of the detours and dead ends into which some firms and segments 
of the market went into. And they would be quite right in a purely (ex-post) diagnostic 
sense. But that diagnostic and understanding does not translate into any ability to foresee 
even the next “hump” and decide that this one path ahead rather than the other would be 
the more correct one. Indeed the approach itself is akin to raising the issue of the  
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relevance or need for say the reptiles and birds or non-primate mammals to have 
emerged and diversified in the evolution of man. We must remember that the number of 
dead ends and niches that have been realised is only a subset of what was possible, and 
the set of all possibilities is not known, certainly not at the beginning of the process. And 
may even be never known. Thus, chance, and individuals and firms, have a role in the 
evolution of the industry that is vastly more significant than in the case of the more usual 
industries such as automobiles, oil, chemicals, etc. In these latter industries one could, 
without being too far from the reality, have taken the position that the key innovations 
were demand driven and supply constrained (that is belong to a small set) and would in 
any case have occurred, once the key discoveries were made. 
 
For these reasons, regulation or competitive policy as in the traditional sense has little 
meaning in IT industries. Nevertheless, certain insights may lead to the contours of a 
fresh approach to aiding and abetting the faster development of the industry. 
 
IV 
The Intra-firm Aspect 
 
The traditional approach has the difficulty in that it recognises only two forms of 
economic organisation - the market, and the firm or the managerial `hierarchy' when firms 
are large and internalise diverse activities and products. In reality there have always been 
some links between firms; even among those that compete vigorously in the market. 
Western culture, which ascribes an absolute meaning to the individual, has intellectually 
found it convenient (and no doubt useful) to therefore make a sharp divide between the 
firm (conscious coordination) and the market (unconscious, unregulated coordination, or 
auto-regulated)
12. But this is only an abstraction of the neo-classicals, as pointed out very 
early by Herbert Simon
13. Even in very simple products like automobiles and 
components, groups of firms require extra-market relationships among them in the form 
of exchange of designs, placement of inspectors at the supplier's shop floor by the 
purchaser, and longer term contracts, etc., for realising a greater part of the economies. 
Societies with lesser (conceptual) need for the dialectic between the market and the firm 
exhibit a larger role for coordination through networks. They also do not see as much 
value in the conceptualisation (or abstraction) of a sharp divide between markets and 
hierarchies. In certain industries (automobiles or electronic goods) in Japan, the network 
of the Kieretsus is the organisation.  
 
So large is the need for firms in the new industries for this network-based coordination 
that even in the US with a culture that in chary of extra market relationships, there has 
now developed a complex web of relationships that is at once evolving and getting 
internalised within firms with takeovers and mergers. The content of these relationships 
involve evolution and agreement of standards, sharing of information about a product - 
before its release (since its value is contingent on others being able to develop `final' 
 
12 The neo-classical economists who believe they understand markets, have therefore, "explained 
firms" as arising out of the existence of transactions costs. While explaining firms in terms of 
markets is one task, another task would be to explain extra-market links between firms in the 
language used to understand markets. This is just beginning with the literature on interfirm 
linkages in the context of small firms. 
13 Simon, Herbert, A. (1977), "Empirically Based Microeconomics," Cambridge University Press.  
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products based upon it), agreement to develop particular products, timing of release of 
new products, sharing of information on possible developments even if the contours are 
not as yet clear, contracts to develop particular products whose need is recognised, cross 
licensing to cover the risks of innovation and standards. 
 
When the coordination required across firm boundaries is more definitive than what the 
above links can provide, and when upon the coordination rests much of the estimated 
future cash flows, then mergers and takeovers happen. A merger or a takeover price of a 
small technology based dynamic firm is certainly a measure, however crude, of the value 
it has created. But that does not mean that the creativity of the `competing' small firm 
whose product/innovation did not fit, has been nil. The competing firm disbands and its 
value as a firm is destroyed, though the creativity of its people could be exploited in other 
firms. In many cases this is appropriate. But in many others, if that happens it would be a 
social loss. The possibility that the “next time round, this time's `loser' could turn the 
winner” is thereby rendered non-existent. This means that the market for extra firm 
coordination arrangements is being limited by the lack of adequate and overarching 
arrangements and frameworks for inter-firm coordination.  The traditional notion of 
competition, which would look suspiciously at such arrangements, would no doubt stand 




Thus, (1) frameworks covering cost sharing in the contingent development of technology; 
(2) oversight by third parties or parties representing users (another segment of industry) in 
the definition of standards; (3) rules to bring about greater transparency and non 
discrimination in disclosure and documentation of features and systems - especially at the 
boundary between activities/products that have a vertical relationship with one another, 
all would considerably enhance the scope for inter firm coordination arrangements. These 
arrangements when both dynamic and stable at the same time reduce considerably the 
need for takeovers. Inter firm arrangements, when between non-equal parties has the 
tendency of being `unfair' to the smaller party
15, especially because the possible 
stupendous returns to its creativity tend to get appropriated by the more dominant firm. 
This tendency, to some extent, can be corrected by arrangements that share costs, benefits 
and risks, which smaller firms may be able to take advantage of. In other words, quicker 
consolidation of innovations within a managerial hierarchy through takeovers is a result 
of "market failure". The legal and conceptual developments to understand and define the 
inter firm boundaries have only just begun. We know that more innovative definitions of 
property and associated rights have for example helped to internalise externalities when 
transaction costs are low, as in the case of pollution. In a similar manner, a residual 
royalty related to future sales (when attribution in part of the technology to a 
 
14 The anti trust laws in the US have now recognised that the agreements between firms for 
technology development are not anti-competitive. But there is obviously a need to go beyond 
agreements for technology to agreements for sharing of production and marketing costs, for funds 
to cover standards propositioning and technology selection risk. 
15 A most significant exception has been the case of the arrangement between Microsoft and IBM 
that led to the PC revolution, with Microsoft contracting to develop DOS. But that Microsoft 
would be able to build an empire on the basis of its freedom to independently license DOS, could 
not have been anticipated, because nobody (not even Microsoft of IBM) anticipated the PC 
market to grow as much as it has.  
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product/service is possible) would lead to some share in the vast benefits out of a certain 
technology or product of the smaller `bought over' firm or its original owners. 
 
V 
The Importance of Market Size 
 
Despite massive state support, neither Japan nor Europe have been able to make inroads 
into US', and more specifically into Silicon Valley's dominance in the creative sub sector 
of the IT industry, especially in that segment of the market that interfaces with the 
customer. It is only in entirely new business areas that have somehow "stood alone", and 
were neglected by the US that outsiders have had a chance.  Thus in sectors where 
hardware manufacturing specifications define the performance (density of ICs on a chip), 
like D-RAM chips, or in video game chips which were ignored by the American market, 
that the Japanese have been able to make inroads. This is because the vast consumer side 
economies, and the supply side economies which are linked together would make the 
potential value of an innovation in a market, a power law relationship to its market size, 
with the power being very much greater than 1. The requirement of coordination across 
firms shifts the advantage to the larger cluster. Thus despite various home origins the 
`centre' of most IT companies becomes the US. Firms have a strong need to lower the 
cost of inter firm communication, and knowledge of the `whole' is vital for success in 
their own efforts (individual) micro efforts, since the value of what is created is a function 
of where in the evolutionary chain, the product or process finds use. It is this contingency 
that drives every firm towards the same cluster. 
 
It is only with some maturity, that is, when rate of output of new ideas/products etc. slows 
down, that other locations, including Europe would have a chance
16. This ties up with the 
fact that success of the industry elsewhere than in the dominant locale is necessarily based 
on a focus on separable branches, or on activities, which needed to interface less with 
other activities. Or when the need for interaction was significant, it was on terms that 
were are definable ex-ante. Alternatively, the thread of development of the industry 
elsewhere, has to be so fundamentally new as to be not seen as being related to the 
developments in the dominant cluster. In other words, only peripheral paths, and `dead 
ends' or fundamentally new technologies can be successfully worked by non-dominant 
locations as long as the centre shows dynamism. 
 
Economics of Connectedness 
 
One element of its dynamism and generating capacity is its openness to fundamentally 
new developments elsewhere. What are options for the non-dominant locations? Clearly 
so large are the economies of being connected to the centre, as also the need to coordinate 
with developments at the dominant location that no closed development (with an initial 
import of technology as in other industries) is really possible. This is because the closed 
development in the alternative location would have to deny itself the benefit (very large) 
of innovation at the centre and elsewhere to which the centre is linked, while betting on 
                                                           
16 The idea here is similar to that of the product cycle (Vernon, Raymond (1964), op.cit.). Therein 
the need to be near the customer drives. Here that need is vastly more acute, and the customer is 
typically the firm. The contingency of change, rather than an exogenous determination of the 
products and processes implies that being in the primary cluster is vital to survival itself.   
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the low probability event that in isolation from the closed centre it would hit upon a 
fundamentally new idea that would be vastly superior to all developments at the centre. 
Indeed, closeness may well be `necessary' or desirable for a really new idea to take root. 
So while no doubt the probability of a fundamentally new innovation increases in relation 
to the resources spent in the distant centre, the dominant centre would always have access 
to the new ideas of the `closed centre', since the `closed centre' can really be closed only 
in one direction. Thus, to the `closed centres'' approach there is a `free-rider' problem. In 
any case, unless the closed centre is substantially large, nothing significant could come. 
But when substantially large, the immediate losses in being closed to the dominant centre 
would also be stupendous. 
 
Thus, the strategy for the industry elsewhere than in the dominant centre, and especially 
so in locales with small markets today, but with a potentially large market tomorrow, 
would be to be as open as possible to the dominant centre. In any case, the risks of closed 
strategy are stupendously large and quite unbearable to all but the largest economies
17. 
Thus policies that directly and indirectly enhance and cheapen the linkage and 
coordination with firms in the dominant centre would be right strategy. 
 
It is in this context that measures that allow a greater space for inter firm coordination 
even across national boundaries, become relevant, and vital. A significant aspect of the 
cross border inter firm linkage, is the movement of people, especially from the smaller 
`centre' to the dominant centre, and back again. Thus, a vastly greater mobility of persons, 
than in most other industries would be required for competition from other potential 
centres and of a fair playing field to unleash the long-term potential of `competing 
centres.' The need for labour and skills mobility is of a vastly higher order than in the 
services industries in general
18.  In feedback industries, the very industry cannot arise 
without the necessary inter firm linkages. Thus, the strategy for countries/ regions 
competing for ‘centres’ would be to negotiate skilled labour access to the firms and 
markets of the dominant centre as a competitive strategy. This, while it broad-bases and 
increases the dominance of the centre and makes for its faster and more open growth, also 
creates large subsidiary clusters which have the long term potential to either be hived off, 




The IT industry both software and hardware is characterised by `vast consumer side scale 
and scope economies' which are incomparably larger than the supply side network 
 
17 There is an additional aspect that needs to be recognised. The fast pace of development of the 
industry means that the discount rates internal to the industry are larger than for the general 
economy. Therefore, such efforts to develop fundamentally new technologies that are in 
opposition to the line of unfoldment in the dominant centre or cluster, would not find takers in the 
market. Hence, the possibility of state involvement opens up.  State involvement has its own 
problems of state failure; few states can at this juncture finance and organise competing closed 
centres in the IT industry. 
18 In traditional service industry like say street cleaning service, if poor country people are not 
allowed to work in the rich countries, then factor price equalisation is affected, but the service 
industry in the poor countries could conceivably grow, as the home market itself grows or other 
tradable sectors grow.  
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economies in industries like pipelines or electricity distribution. In IT the supply side 
economies are also incomparably larger because the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
the software of the software or hardware especially the former is very small. But their 
uniqueness arises on the demand side. The interaction of these two economies, in a 
situation of heightened technological dynamism, imposes a greater degree of contingency, 
and hence path dependency in the developments in the industry as a whole. In this respect 
these industries are therefore distinguished from nearly all other prior industries. It makes 
possible giants line Microsoft, which even as they extract significant part of the scale 
economies in the form of large profits, also keep them competitive in the more relevant 
dynamic sense. The endogeniety of the critical points in the development of the industry 
implies considerable scope for strategy on the part of the large firm. It also means that 
interfirm links dynamically develop and thrive even in societies like the US that have 
been abhorrent of extra-market links, and have recognised only two kinds of economic 
coordination - in firms (managerial hierarchies) and through markets. Thus physical 
clusters in IT have a far stronger economic logic, and the difficulties in the emergence of 
new clusters are far more severe. 
 
Traditional anti-trust like regulation or price regulation are entirely outmoded for the 
development of these industries. To challengers (countries and clusters) few independent 
options exist. Strategies with the most potential would involve promoting inter-firm 
linkages, promoting industries with the least need to be in contact with other firms, in 
fresh clusters. The effort has to be to lower the time and cost of networking with the 
dominant cluster. The costs of disassociation are too large even for large countries 
attempting to have a role in the evolution of IT industries. 
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